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Research on theory of mind began in the context of determining whether chimpanzees are
aware that individuals experience cognitive and emotional states. More recently, this
research has involved various groups of children and various tasks, including the false belief
task. Based almost exclusively on that paradigm, investigators have concluded that although
‘‘normal ’’ hearing children develop theory of mind by age 5, children who are autistic or deaf
do not do so until much later, perhaps not until their teenage years. The present study
explored theory of mind by examining stories told by children who are deaf and hearing (age
9–15 years) for statements ascribing behaviour-relevant states of mind to themselves and
others. Both groups produced such attributions, although there were reliable differences
between them. Results are discussed in terms of the cognitive abilities assumed to underlie
false belief and narrative paradigms and the implications of attributing theory of mind solely
on the basis of performance on the false belief task.
Keywords: Sign language}DSL, social cognition, theory of mind, deafness.
Over the last 25 years, essentially since Stokoe’s (1960)
explication of the linguistic status of American Sign
Language (ASL), there have been remarkable strides in
better understanding the psychological development and
academic abilities of children who are deaf (see Emmorey
& Lane, 2000; see Marschark & Clark, 1993, 1998). Such
advances notwithstanding, there remain several cognitive
domains in which children who are deaf are claim-
ed—rightly or not—to lag far behind hearing agemates.
Previous claims of this sort often have proven to be
without foundation or have been shown to be the product
of methodological or theoretical confounds. This paper
concerns an area in which the issue is still to be resolved:
theory of mind.
Premack and Woodruff (1978) ushered in theory of
mind research as part of their efforts to determine the
cognitive and language abilities of chimpanzees. Ac-
cording to Premack and Woodruff, ‘‘An individual has a
theory of mind if he imputes mental states to himself and
to others ’’ (p. 515). These mental states were said to
include purpose, intention, knowledge, belief, thinking,
doubt, guessing, pretending, and liking. Based on a series
of experiments involving a 14-year-old African-born
chimpanzee, Premack and Woodruff argued that
chimpanzees possess a theory of mind, ‘‘not markedly
different from our own’’ (p. 515), imputing intentions
Requests for reprints to: Marc Marschark, PhD, Department
of Research, National Technical Institute for the Deaf, 96
Lomb Memorial Drive, Rochester, New York 14623, U.S.A.
(E-mail : memrtl!rit.edu).
and purposes, aswell as knowledge andbeliefs, to humans
with whom they were familiar.
Premack and Woodruff’s claims—and the continuing
discussion about them—are relevant to the current
interest in human children’s theories of mind, but they
will not be detailed here. For the present purposes, two
observations will suffice: First, although several com-
mentators have offered theoretical disclaimers and other
explanations for primate success in theory of mind tasks,
those accounts still appear to bestow upon chimpanzees
sufficient cognitive and problem-solving sophistication as
to make intended distinctions between their cognitive
abilities and those underpinning theory of mind rather
elusive (Savage-Rumbaugh, Rumbaugh, &Boysen, 1978;
cf. Heyes, 1998). Second, it is noteworthy that theory of
mind is an area in which chimpanzees have been credited
with abilities that are denied to children who are deaf,
even if the direct comparison is not explicitly stated.
Research concerning theory of mind in human children
has been active for more than 15 years. The term itself is
typically used in a relatively limited sense to refer to the
knowledge and representation of mental states that allow
children to explain human behaviour or demonstrate
their belief that mental states play a causal role in the
behaviours of others (Courtin & Melot, 1998; Heyes,
1998; Perner, Leekham, & Wimmer, 1987). As early as
age 3, children begin to attribute mental states to
themselves and others and use language in a variety of
ways to refer to those states (Wellman, 1990; see Lewis &
Mitchell, 1994). Over the next 2 years, a ‘‘represen-
tational ’’ theory of mind develops by which a child comes
to understand that mental states are interpretations of the
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world which may be true or false and which lead
individuals to take appropriate or inappropriate actions
(Wellman, 1988, 1990). This transition is seen to represent
a significant change in theory of mind, as well as cognitive
sophistication at large.
Following the early research on theory of mind in
chimpanzees and hearing children came an important
series of studies involving children who were autistic,
retarded, or had other developmental disabilities. Lead-
ing this body of research was a study by Baron-Cohen,
Leslie, and Frith (1985) involving the false belief task
(Wimmer & Perner, 1983). Their results showed that
children with autism had considerable difficulty with that
paradigm, performing significantly worse than both
‘‘normal ’’ children and children with Down’s syndrome.
Baron-Cohen et al. concluded that even into adolescence,
individuals with autism do not possess theories of mind.
Although the false belief task is only one means of
tapping theory of mind, it is now employed by most
investigators working in this area. The most common
version of the task is the two-trial ‘‘Sally-Anne’’ problem.
On the first trial, the child sees a puppet (Sally) hide a
marble in a basket and then ‘‘ leave the room.’’ While
Sally is gone, another puppet (Anne) removes the marble
from the basket and hides it in a box. Sally then returns,
and the child is asked ‘‘Where will Sally look for her
marble? ’’ or less ambiguously, ‘‘Where will Sally first
look for her marble? ’’ (Peterson & Siegal, 1995). Two
control questions follow, ‘‘Where is the marble really? ’’
and ‘‘Where did Sally put the marble in the beginning?’’,
to ensure that the child actually saw and understood what
happened. On the second trial, the same script is followed,
but the marble is moved to the experimenter’s pocket or
some other location, thus giving only a 33% chance of
the child correctly answering the question by chance.
Most frequently, children must pass both trials to be
credited with understanding false beliefs, a performance
that would happen by chance only 17% of the time.
Baron-Cohen et al. (1985) argued that observed failures
on the false belief task by children with autism, and on
theory of mind tasks more generally, result from a specific
neurological deficit unique to autism and limited to
reasoning about mental states (cf. Lee & Hobson, 1998).
That conclusion is consistent with the success of children
with Down’s syndrome on the false belief task, and
appears to rule out the possibility that a failure to develop
theory of mind has its origins in mental retardation,
emotional or motivational deficits, or a lack of social
experience. It also is consistent with the finding that
children who are autistic (and children who are deaf)
perform well on tasks that require physical perspective-
taking or recognition of false physical situations (e.g., a
fake photograph that does not match perceptual ex-
perience).
Peterson and Siegal (1995, 1996), however, have
suggested a socially based explanation of the apparent
lack of theory of mind in children with autism, one that
would also apply to children who are deaf. They argued
that the understanding of false beliefs and development
of theory of mind normally follows from conversational
interactions between parents and children. The lack of
such interactions between children with autism and their
parents denies them social experience and communicative
feedback concerningmental states, information necessary
to be able to impute mental states to others.
In a series of rigorous and informative studies, Peterson
and Siegal have convincingly demonstrated that children
who are prelingually deaf and have hearing parents fail
the false belief task as frequently or more frequently than
children with autism, while hearing preschoolers pass the
task easily (e.g., Peterson & Siegal, 1997). Peterson and
Siegal (1995), for example, reported a failure rate of 83%
in the standard task for children who are deaf and 50%
with the ‘‘conversationally supported’’ question ‘‘Where
will Sally first look for her marble? ’’ Peterson and Siegal
(1997) obtained a 56% failure rate among children who
are deaf, compared to a 38% failure rate among children
with autism.
Petersen and Siegal draw support for their theoretical
position from Tager-Flusberg’s (1992) finding that
dialogues between children with autism and their mothers
are almost totally devoid of mentions of mental states,
whereas such references are relatively common between
children who have Down’s syndrome and their mothers.
Also consistent with the conversational-deprivation ex-
planation of their results, Peterson and Siegal (1996 and
1999) found higher success rates among two groups of
children who were deaf : those who used sign language
with parents who were deaf and those who used spoken
language (instead of sign language) with parents who
were hearing. More than 90% of children who are deaf
have hearing parents. Insofar as most of those children
are not able to make use of spoken language for the
purposes of day-to-day life and most of those parents are
unable to use sign language for the purposes of day-to-
day life, the ability to engage in normal conversational
interaction in such families is limited at best (see
Marschark, 1993, in press, for discussion). Both of the
situations identified by Peterson and Siegal, in contrast,
are situations in which a shared mode of communication
would presumably allow for more conversational in-
terchange within the family".
Peterson and Siegal usually have worded conclusions
from their studies in terms of their 5–13-year-old
participants failing the false belief task or other theory of
mind tasks. Nevertheless, those findings are usually
interpreted as simply meaning that children who are deaf
do not have theories of mind, an inference made explicit
by Peterson and Siegal (1998). That position also has
been adopted by Russell et al. (1998), who claim that
most children who are deaf do not gain theories of mind
until their teenage years, a full 10 years later than hearing
children. Like Peterson and Siegal, Russell et al. argue
that this delay results from limited opportunities for
children who are deaf and have hearing parents to learn
about mental states from others. In their case, Russell et
al. emphasize the importance of social interactions during
the early school years.
Courtin and Melot (1998) also raise the issue of
communication abilities among children who are deaf in
the theory of mind task, noting that the number and skill
of communication partners, communication mode and
communication quality, and a variety of background
differences may create difficulties for testing and inter-
preting results concerning theory of mind. They suggest,
however, that children who are deaf might have some
" This argument appears valid in the case of children who are
deaf and have deaf parents, who thus share a language.
Communication of children who are deaf and use oral com-
munication with their parents usually is less effective, and
normal conversational interactions are rare (Marschark, 1993,
in press).
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advantages in this regard, particularly as the use of sign
language might foster visual perspective-taking skills, one
precursor of theory of mind (p. 85). In a study involving
deaf and hearing French children engaged in a variety of
theory of mind tasks, including the false belief paradigm,
they found that children who are deaf and used sign
language were more frequently successful, overall, than
children who are deaf and used spoken language (cf.
Peterson & Siegal, 1997, 1998). In the false belief tasks, 5-
year-old children who were deaf and had deaf parents
showed the strongest performance, with 5-year-old hear-
ing children and 7-year-old children who were deaf but
had hearing parents just behind and not significantly
different from each other. The 7-year-old ‘‘oral ’’ children
showed the poorest performance. These results contrast
with those obtained by Peterson and Siegal with
Australian children, but they apparently are not un-
common with French children (Courtin, 2000; see Cour-
tin & Melot, 1998, p. 93).
Also contrasting with the Peterson and Siegal results is
a study by Steeds, Rowe, and Dowker (1997). They found
that among children who were deaf, aged 5 to 12 years of
age, 67% passed the false belief task, a passing rate more
than twice that obtained by Peterson and Siegal (1995).
For the moment, we will assume that variability among
deaf children may be responsible for such conflicting
findings, especially when there are small samples, as in the
Courtin and Melot (1998) study. In any case, we fully
accept the quality of the research by Peterson and Siegal
and do not argue with their methodologies or the more
narrow (i.e., false belief task) interpretation of their
results.
The point of this article is rather to follow up on the
warning of Gray and Hosie (1996, p. 229) that we should
be ‘‘reluctant to pin faith on a single measure as an
indicator ’’ of whether or not deaf children have theories
of mind. Gray and Hosie’s caution was one of degree:
‘‘Since, through their acquisition of sign language,
prelingually deaf children of hearing parents eventually
do gain extensive conversational experience, there is good
reason to expect that their development of theory of mind
is delayed, rather than prevented altogether’’ (p. 229).
That prediction was later supported by the Russell et al.
(1998) finding that deaf 13–16-year-olds were more likely
to pass the false belief task than 4–12-year-olds.
In contrast to the relative claim of Gray and Hosie, and
despite their recent findings, we wish to make a more
absolute claim here : that deaf children have been shown
only to fail the false belief task and that they may, in fact,
have theories of mind at least as well developed as hearing
peers. Remmel, Bettger, and Weinberg (in press) have
made a similar argument, suggesting that ‘‘The acqui-
sition of the theory of mind is often erroneously equated
with mastery of false belief tasks during the preschool
years. Although beliefs are a key component, a full-
fledged theory of mind encompasses many other mental
phenomena as well. ’’ Consistent with that suggestion,
all of the children in the Steeds et al. (1997) study were
able to predict an individuals’ emotions on the basis of
their desires (e.g., that getting something that is wanted
will make a person happy). Nevertheless, they also found
that predicting another’s emotions or actions on the basis
of false beliefs was more difficult.
Success on the false belief task has become a hallmark
of theory of mind since it was introduced by Wimmer and
Perner (1983). The reason(s) why deaf children do so
poorly in that paradigm would be interesting and
important to determine, and various investigators may
well be right in attributing those failures to a lack of early
conversational experience with parents (Peterson &
Siegal, 1995; cf. Marschark, Mouradian, & Halas, 1994)
or social experience in school (Russell et al., 1998; cf.
Lederberg, 1991). At its root, however, the question is
whether deaf children understand that they and others
have mental states that can lead to desires and actions. As
Courtin (2000) suggested, ‘‘The idea is to find out how
children manage to understand that the mind creates
mental entities which are not necessarily exact replicas of
reality, that such representations may therefore differ
across individuals, and thus every person may respond
differently in an apparently identical event. ’’
Undoubtedly valuable as a means of determining
whether children can predict another’s behaviour, the
false belief task is qualitatively more than the imputation
of mental states to self and others (Remmel et al., in
press). Simply put, our question was whether or not deaf
children typically ascribe various mental states to them-
selves and others and recognize them as being causal with
regard to behaviour. To the extent that they do so as
frequently as hearing peers, we would be hard-pressed to
deny them theories of mind. In the present study,
therefore, we examined the stories told by groups of deaf
and hearing children in approximately the same age range
as that used by investigators employing the false belief
task. If deaf children really lack (Peterson & Siegal, 1998)
or are delayed in (Gray & Hosie, 1996; Russell et al.,
1998) their theories of mind relative to hearing peers, such
differences should be readily apparent in the stories they
tell about the behaviours of individuals—themselves and
others—when involved in complex situations (Moore,
Pure, & Furrow, 1990).
Method
Participants
Fifteen children who are deaf and 15 children who are
hearing participated in this study. Videotaped signed and
spoken stories, respectively, were chosen from a larger pool
collected in the course of several previous studies. Selection of
particular participants’ videotapes was based solely on age-
matching among 9–15-year-olds in the pool, and included a mix
of children who were and were not involved in previous studies.
Children in the selected hearing sample ranged in age from 10;6
to 15;5 years with a mean of 13;2 (SD 1–60). Children in the
selected deaf sample ranged in age from 9;7 to 15;10 years with
a mean of 13;1 (SD 1–58). According to school records, all of
the latter children had severe to profound hearing losses and
hearing parents. They were enrolled in a school with a total
communication philosophy (i.e., use of signed and spoken
language with support for residual hearing), and all used sign
language as their primary means of communication at school.
School records indicated no particular medical or handicapping
conditions among the deaf or hearing students. All participants
were solicited through their schools.
For the purposes of this study, it would be informative to
examine the performance of the children who are deaf relative
to their skills in spoken versus sign language. Information in
this regard was not available from the available records,
however, and children’s productions did not allow analyses in
that regard post hoc. Although the experimenters used speech
and sign language simultaneously with the children, some
children used their voices while others did not. Children who
used their voices varied in both the intelligibility of their speech
and its consistency, ranging from one child who voiced
everything he signed to several children who voiced only rarely
during their stories.
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Procedure
Each child was asked to tell a story, supposedly to be shown
to other children of the same hearing status but with lesser
language skills. This methodology tends to produce more
mental state attribution than if the children had told their
stories directly to an adult (Moore et al., 1990). Each child was
given one of two fantasy themes (randomly determined) : what
it would be like to be picked up by a flying saucer or what it
would be like to find a whole new civilization living under the
ocean. Children were encouraged to tell the story from their
own perspectives, as though they were the primary protagonists,
but the task required them to be involved with other individuals.
That is, they were asked ‘‘What would the people there be like?
What would happen to you?’’ This paradigm thus encouraged
children to make use of mental states to explain behaviour in
complex situations requiring sequenced, goal-oriented activities
(Marschark, Mouradian, & Halas, 1994).
Videotape transcriptions of the hearing children’s stories
were prepared directly from the videotapes. Transcription of
stories by children who are deaf was done by a nationally
certified (U.S.) sign language interpreter. This was done literally
rather than in English ‘‘gloss ’’ in order to avoid any inadvertent
additions or losses of information. Transcripts were double-
checked by the experimenters who had collected the videotapes.
Corrections were rare, usually involving sequences in which
there were errors or omissions in the sign language produced.
The experimenters and the interpreter were in complete agree-
ment on the final transcripts.
Scoring
Each transcript was scored independently by three of the
authors for (1) occurrences of mental state attribution to self or
another and (2) classification of the mental state attribution as
involving belief, doubt, feeling}desire, purpose}goals, knowl-
edge, liking, or thinking. Initially, the scorers worked out what
they were looking for and practised scoring by working through
six transcripts together.After coding all transcripts individually,
they met again and ‘‘re-trained. ’’ After re-examining and
adjusting their scoring, the coded transcripts were compared
line by line. Attributions assigned by only a single scorer were
discarded. Attributions were agreed upon by all 3 of the scorers
in 124 out of the remaining 159 cases (78%). Separate analyses
were conducted including attributions identified by all three
scorers and those identified by at least two scorers. Given the
varying lengths of the stories produced by the children (means:
deaffl 213 words, hearingfl 279 words), all analyses were
based on proportional scores obtained by dividing the number
of mental state attributions in a story by the total number of
words in that story (‹100).
Following the methodological caution of Brown, Donelan-
McCall, and Dunn (1996), utterances in which children used
apparent state-of-mind references rhetorically (e.g., ‘‘ ..., you
know?’’ ‘‘Guess what? ’’) were not scored. Brown et al. found a
significant, positive relation between use of mental state terms
in conversation and success in the false belief explanation task;
and Moore et al. (1990) found that children who used such
expressions more often also were more successful on false belief
tasks. Nevertheless it seemed prudent to take a conservative
approach in the present study, and such introductory references
were rare in any case.
Results
Overall, only two of the children who are deaf (13%)
and three of the children who are hearing (20%) failed to
produce any mental state attributions. The 13% figure is
far below the failure rate on the false belief task reported
by Peterson and Siegal for children who are deaf and have
hearing parents. The 20% figure for hearing children is
generally consistent with their findings for normal,
hearing preschoolers in that task.
Mental state descriptions included attributions to
groups of individuals as well as to individuals within
groups. An example of the former can be found in the
description by a girl who is hearing about an underwater
city where people do not have eyes :
...you know and they considered me imperfect
because I had eyes so you know I wanted to get out
of the place...
An example of the latter can be found in the description
by a boy who is deaf about finding an ally in his attempt
to flee a UFO after killing two of his captors#.
I WAS PICKED UP BY UFO. UFO PEOPLE
LOOK LIKE LIZARD ... I WAS BEAT UP BY
LIZARD. I BECAME ANGRY AND KILLED
TWO LIZARDS, AND I SEARCHED FOR
PERSON WHO CAN HELP ME [to escape]. I
FOUND ONE LIZARD WHO VERY FRIGHT-
ENED TO GET CAUGHT ... AND HE LIKE
TO BE FRIENDS WITH ALL PEOPLE, AND I
TOLD HIM HOW TO GET TO CONTROL
ROOM. AND HE TOLD ME WHERE TO GO,
SO I WAY, ALSO HE WAY WITH ME, AND WE
FOUND CONTROL ROOM ... MADE UFO
COME DOWN EARTH [and we escaped].
Preliminary t-tests revealed no reliable differences be-
tween deaf and hearing children within any of the
individual mental state classifications. There also were no
reliable correlations between age and the frequency of
imputing any of the individual mental states, a finding
consistent with those of Courtin and Melot (1998).
Therefore, mental states were collapsed in all subsequent
analyses, except where noted below.
Initial 2 (deaf vs. hearing) by 2 (self vs. other at-
tribution) analyses of variance were conducted with the
proportional number of self and other attributions as
dependent variables. The analysis involving the more
conservative, three-scorer criterion yielded marginal
effects of hearing status, F(1, 28)fl 4–12, pfl–05, MSefl
0–59, and self vs. other attributions, F(1, 28)fl 3–79, pfl
–06, MSefl 1–24, reflecting the fact that children who are
deaf produced more mental state attributions than
children who are hearing, overall, and that there were
more self-attributions than other attributions (see Table
1). Using the more lenient, two-scorer criterion, the main
effect of hearing status was reliable, F(1, 28)fl 4–32, p!
–05, MSefl 0–76, again in favor of the deaf children, but
the effect of self vs. other was still only marginal, F(1,
28)fl 3–28, pfl–08, MSefl 1–49. The hearing status by
self vs. other attributions interaction was not reliable in
either analysis, both Fs!–15.
Correlations computed between age and the pro-
portion of mental state attributions did not yield any
reliable effects, ps!–30, with either scoring criterion.
This result contrasts with Peterson and Siegal’s (1999)
finding that age was significantly related to success on
their false belief task, lending support to our suggestion
that the false belief task and attributions of mental states
are not equivalent abilities. Most of the Peterson and
Siegal studies have involved children between 8 and 13
years, however, and it could be argued that our inclusion
# Capital letters indicate English gloss of sign language pro-
duction.
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Table 1
Attributions of Mental States to Self and Others: Means (SDs) (Proportional
Scores—Number of Attributions}100 Words in a Story)
Hearing status
Scoring criterion
Strict (3-scorer) Lenient (2-scorer)
Self Other Self Other
Deaf 1–56 (1–33) 0–58 (0–81) 1–76 (1–50) 0–79 (0–96)
Hearing 0–74 (0–91) 0–60 (0–63) 0–89 (0–95) 0–72 (0–65)
Total 1–15 (1–20) 0–59 (0–71) 1–32 (1–31) 0–75 (0–81)
of children as old as 15 years might have provided a
different snapshot in the development of theory of mind.
Indeed, Russell et al. (1998) found that deaf children
between 13 and 16 years of age were significantly more
likely to pass the false belief task than children between 4
and 12 years of age. Therefore, the analyses of variance
and correlational analyses were re-run, using only the 10
youngest children in each group (all between 9 and 13
years), resulting in mean ages of 12;3 and 12;5 for the
deaf and hearing samples, respectively. Those analyses
yielded results similar to the original ones. Younger deaf
children produced significantly more mental state
attributions than the younger hearing children, F(1, 18)
fl 4–45, p!–05, MSefl 0–72, and there were no reliable
correlations with age. The difference between the present
results and those of Peterson and Siegal therefore cannot
be attributed to differences in the ages of the participants,
and thus we must look elsewhere for an explanation.
True and False Beliefs
The actual frequency with which children explicitly
referred to beliefs (either believing or not believing), using
the verb to believe was quite low: two hearing children
each used the verb once. More frequently, deaf and
hearing children referred to their own beliefs and the
beliefs of others using the verb to think (e.g., ‘‘They
thought I wanted to steal their gold. ’’). In an attempt to
discern any differences between deaf and hearing children
with regard to their attributions of false (and true) beliefs,
an additional analysis was conducted. This included all
children who used either a form of the verb to believe or
the verb to think : 9 of the 15 children who are deaf and 10
of the 15 children who are hearing. A total of 46
occurrences of these verbs had been scored, and they are
collectively referred to as ‘‘beliefs ’’ below. This analysis
follows from the argument of Moore et al. (1990) that the
use of the verb ‘‘ to think’’ depends on knowledge that
mental states reflect propositional attitudes toward real
states of affairs and thus validly reflect mental state
understanding.
For the purposes of this analysis, each story was read
by an assistant who was naive with regard to the content
area and hypotheses of this study. On the basis of story
content, each belief was classified as true, false, or
indeterminate. A 2 (hearing status) ‹2 (self vs. other
attribution) ‹3 (true, false, indeterminate belief ) analysis
of variance was then conducted in which the latter two
variables were within subjects. Overall, there was no
difference between deaf and hearing groups in their
attributions of beliefs, nor were any of the interactions
involving hearing status reliable. The only reliable main
effect was the greater frequency of attributing true beliefs
(meanfl 1–36) relative to false (0–42) or indeterminate
(0–16) beliefs, F(2, 34)fl 22–80, p!–001, MSefl 0–35.
The only reliable interaction was the fact that true self-
attributions of belief occurred much more frequently
than any of the other alternatives, F(2, 34)fl 9–45, p!
–01, MSefl 0–36.
Five attributions of false beliefs were made by children
who were hearing and three by children who were deaf.
For example, one deaf child described a situation in
which his parents did not believe a situation that was true
(i.e., a false belief ) :
I SEE LIGHT BOTHER ME. WAKE-UP ME
THEN SAW UFO COME. SAW WEIRD UFO.
WHAT, I SAID, WHAT’S THAT? ... AND I
TOLDMYMOTHER ... ‘‘KNOWUFOCOMING
HERE’’ BUT MOTHER REFUSE BELIEVE ME
AND MY DAD REFUSE BELIEVE ME.
Discussion
Using a narrative methodology rather than the false
belief task, the present results suggest that children who
are deaf, between the ages of 9 and 15 years, are fully
capable of attributing mental states to others as well as
to themselves. Indeed, those children did so slightly but
significantly more often than did age-matched hearing
peers. By the original and most common definition,
therefore, theory of mind was demonstrated in this study
by 87% of the children who are deaf and 80% of the
children who are hearing. Analysis of the frequencies
with which children referred to false and true beliefs,
either their own or others, did not indicate any differences
as a function of hearing status. While these results surely
will not be surprising to anyone who regularly interacts
with deaf children, they clearly contradict conclusions
drawn from a variety of studies employing the false belief
task. In particular, studies by Peterson and Siegal (1995,
1996, 1997, 1998, 1999) and Russell et al. (1998) have
shown that deaf children of hearing parents perform at
about the same level as children with autism in the false
belief task, leading to the conclusion that children who
are deaf lack theory of mind or, at best, lag significantly
behind their hearing peers in that regard.
As in the Peterson and Siegal studies, participants in
the present study who were deaf also were rather older
than the 4 to 5 years typically assumed as the age at which
theory of mind emerges in ‘‘normal ’’ hearing children.
We therefore are unable to definitively claim that deaf
children do not show any delay in their theories of mind
relative to hearing children. Nevertheless, the present
findings clearly indicate that assertions that children of
this age who are deaf lack theories of mind, which are
based solely on their performance in the false belief task,
are wrong.
1072 M. MARSCHARK et al.
The importance of such findings go beyond the simple
question of whether or not children who are deaf
demonstrate a theory of mind at any particular age. In
view of their obvious difficulties with the false belief task,
those children have been attributed with autistic-like
qualities and said to be threatened by other develop-
mental dangers (e.g., Gray & Hosie, 1996; Peterson &
Siegal, 1995). The reason for this particular performance
deficit may well reside in their relative lack of oppor-
tunities to engage in conversation about mental states at
an early age, although the present results indicate that
they are aware of such states and freely attribute them to
others within sign language.
There remain other aspects of the false belief task,
different from those involved in mental state attributions,
that also might be at issue here. Perhaps the most obvious
is that whereas demonstrating theory of mind requires
only that children understand their own and}or others’
mental states and recognize that these states lead to
behaviour (Courtin & Melot, 1998; Wellman, 1990), the
false belief task requires that they actually predict the
behaviour of others based on inferred mental states.
Some time ago, Odom, Blanton and Laukhuf (1973)
demonstrated that although deaf children, aged 7 to 12
years, could identify emotions based on facial
expressions, they were significantly worse than hearing
peers in their ability to predict those mental states on the
basis of behavioural sequences that might elicit them.
Similar findings have been reported by Gray, Hosie,
Russell, and Ormel (in press). As in the present situation,
such findings suggest that the understanding that others
have emotions is a simpler or earlier-developed ability
than predicting emotionally based behaviour. They have
never, however, been interpreted to mean that deaf
children do not understand emotional states.
It has been suggested that the narrative methodology
employed in the present research provides more of an
implicit than explicit evaluation of theory of mind. In
particular, it could be argued that in the pretense created
by the methodology, deaf and hearing children were
following experience- or literature-derived scripts in their
use of mental attribution terms and did not really intend
them or understand them as reflecting the mental states of
others. In other words, it could be claimed that the
narrative methodology did not require children to have a
conscious understanding of the representational mind in
order to contrast character beliefs with either true states
of affairs or with behaviours that might occur in less
fanciful situations.
Although we do not have data that guarantee the
explicit use of such representations in all cases of mental
state attribution found with this paradigm, it is unclear
how the children in this study could have produced the
stories they did without fully active theories of mind.
Brown et al. (1996) similarly have argued that the
pragmatic roles played by such mental state attributions
in hearing children’s conversations with peers warrants
their being taken as indicators of the understanding of
mental representation required for theory of mind.
The false belief task requires more than just a theory of
mind and, as such, is perhaps too conservative a criterion.
Further, the acknowledged language lags in many chil-
dren who are deaf and have hearing parents caution us
that any task as linguistically complex as the false belief
task is prone to underestimate their cognitive skills (see
Marschark, 1993, for related findings in other domains).
At the very least, the present methodology emphasizes
the danger in relying on a single task in deciding whether
children should be labeled as ‘‘deficient ’’ in a particular
domain.
The success of deaf children in the false belief tasks of
Courtin and Melot (1998) and Steeds et al. (1997) suggest
that some deaf children with hearing parents are quite
capable in the domain of theory of mind—or that some
experiments are better at bringing it out. Beyond the
apparent ability to attribute theory of mind and recognize
that beliefs influence behaviour as expressed in the
narrative paradigm, there are other indicators that
children who are deaf possess a full mental representation
of mental states. For example, programs that encourage
such children to reflect on each other’s ideas, think about
an author’s intentions, and understand characters’
perspectives have been found to enhance reading and
critical thinking skills (Rothman & Sadler-Hormazabal,
1999). Similarly, Marschark et al. (1994) showed that
deaf students in the same age range used semantically
well-structured sequences including characters’ goals,
actions, and outcomes in signing and writing stories
about what they would do in novel situations.
At this point, the research agenda with regard to deaf
children’s theory of mind seems clear. It would be
important to conduct studies with deaf children, aged 4 to
15 years, to determine any relation between performance
on the false belief task and the ability to attribute
particular mental states to others in a narrative task such
as this one (i.e., a conditional analysis). It also would be
important to determine precisely how early deaf children
begin to attribute mental states to others in ways that
recognize the behaviour-governing nature of those states,
rather than their simple attribution. We know that
understanding and simple attribution of mental states
develops in hearing children by around age 3 (see Lewis &
Mitchell, 1994; Wellman, 1990), and such understanding
may be found to occur just as early in deaf children,
regardless of the relatively limited opportunities of
linguistic interactions with their hearing parents prior to
age 5. At the very least, it appears that we are in need of
further research to understand the full complexities of the
false belief task as it relates to language fluency and
theory of mind. Otherwise, we may continue to conclude
that children who are deaf, and other children who differ
in some way from the norm, are generally cognitively
deficient on the basis of a single complex task.
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